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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Federal Estate Tax-Marital Deduction-Apportionment
Death taxes are levied either on the privilege of transmitting or re-
ceiving property.1 The federal estate tax is of the former type 2 and is
imposed on the net estate of decedents3 "to the extent of the interest
of the decedent at the time of his death." The ultimate burden of the
tax may vary -depending upon (1) the jurisdiction administering the
estate, (2) the type of property involved, and (3) the presence or ab-
sence of direction of the burden by the testator or settlor.5 The burden
of the tax is a matter of state law6 and in the majority of common law
states the tax is payable from the residue of the estate7 unless a contrary
intention is shown by the decedent.8  An analysis of the cases requiring
payment of the tax from the residue of the estate shows the following
theories relied upon for the result: (1) the tax is levied on the whole
estate and not the individual shares, thus there is a presumption against
requiring individuals to contribute to the tax;9 (2) the Internal Rev-
' MONTGOmERY, FEDERAL TAXES 462 (1952).
2 INT. REV. CODE § 810, New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345 (1921).
'INT. REV. CODE § 810, Reg. 105 § 81.4.
'INT. REV. CODE § 811 (a), Reg. 105 §81.13
' All three factors are usually present in every case. The factors may further
be classified as follows: (1) "jurisdiction," (a) common law states, (b) equitable
apportionment states, (c) statutory apportionment states; (2) the "property," (a)
testamentary property, (b) intestate property and transfers of property included
in decedent's estate under certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, e.g.,
§ 811 (c) and (d); (3) this material does not contemplate covering the cases
on the specific language of testator necessary to direct the burden of taxes, but
only the result obtained in certain cases after the court has ruled on the meaning
of the words.
0 "We are of opinion that Congress intended the federal estate tax should be
paid out of the estate as a whole and that the applicable state law as to the devolu-
tion of property at death should govern the distribution of the remainder and the
ultimate impact of the federal tax ... " Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95, 97
(1942).
"Considering the problem as an open question, we begin with the principle . . .
that the federal estate tax statute leaves it to the states to detrmine how the tax
burden shall be distributed among those who share in the taxed estate." In re
Heringer's Estate, 38 Wash. 2d 399, 403, 230 P. 2d 297, 300 (1951).
'Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N. E. 114 (1922), aff'd, 264 U. S.
47 (1924) ; Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P. 2d 469 (1924) ; Bemis
v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N. E. 686 (1923); Gelin v. Gelin, 296 Minn.
516, 40 N. W. 2d 342 (1949) ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Wintrop, 238 N. Y.
477, 144 N. W. 686 (1924) ; Craig v. Craig, 232 N. C. 729, 62 S. E. 2d 336 (1951) :
Seattle-First National Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203 P. 2d 1078
(1949).
"The unfortunate nature of this situation was pointed out in 1930, by the New
York State Commission to Report Defects in the Law of Estates in the finding
that 'experience has demonstrated that in most estates, the residuary legatees are
the widow, children or nearer and more dependent relatives.'" Mitnick, State
Legislative Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, 10 MD. L. REv. 289 (1949).
a "A careful reading of decedent's will fails to find any expression of decedent's
intention insofar as payment of federal estate tax is concerned." Gelin v. Gelin,
229 Minn. 516, 520, 40 N. W. 2d 342, 345 (1949). "In other jurisdictions, the
majority of courts have held that the federal estate tax burden is a charge against
and payable from the residue of an estate. . . ." Id. at 522, 40 N. W. 2d at 346.
' This argument is based on the nature of the tax and not on testator's silence
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enue Code requires the personal representative to pay the tax, therefore
it must be taken from the residuary estate in the same manner as debts
and expenses of administration ;'o and (3) "the courts can not speculate
concerning the intention of settlors and testators as to where they intend
the burden of taxes to rest."" Some states have enacted apportionment
statutes distributing the tax burden 1 2 and in two situations the Internal
Revenue Code allows the personal representative limited rights of re-
covery where there has been no direction as to payment of the tax.18
In 1948 Congress enacted a complicated marital deduction provision
in order to put non-community states on a substantial footing with those
states having community property rights.1 4  In substance, it allows a
deduction up to 50% of the adjusted gross estate for property passing to
the surviving spouse if certain requirements are fulfilled. 15
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 6 a case of first impression
in North Carolina, the widow dissented from decedent's will and elected
to take her statutory share." In an action by the executor for direction
as to the burden of the tax. Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471,
124 N. E. 265 (1919).
Perhaps the leading decision on this point is Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47,
50 (1924) where the court held: "What was being imposed here was an excise
upon the transfer of an estate upon death of the owner. It was not a tax upon
death of the owner. . . . What this law taxes is not the interest to which the
legatees and devisees succeeded on death, but the interest which ceased by reason
of the death."
" In Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N. H. 471,
200 Atl. 786 (1938), the court held as the executor was required to pay the tax
before distribution, the tax was a charge against the estate, and like other debts
of administration, must he paid from the residue. Hughes v. Sun Life Assur.
Co. 159 F. 2d 110 (9th Cir. 1946); First Nat. Bank v. Hart, 383 Ill. 489, 50
N. E. 2d 461 (1943); Gelin v. Gelin, 229 Minn. 516, 40 N. W. 2d 342 (1949).
• Cf. Bigoness v. Anderson, 106 F. Supp. 986 (D. D. C. 1952), holding that
there was no reason to distinguish between the federal estate tax and debts of the
decedent and that if personalty in the residuary estate was not sufficient to pay the
tax then resort to the realty in the residuary estate could be made.
" Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 149 N. E. 686 (1923) (Testator was
silent on the subject of taxes.) For collection of cases involving testamentary
direction see Notes, 115 A. L. R. 916; 117 A. L. R. 1186; 15 A. L. R. 2d 1216.
"
2ARIC. STAT. ANN. § 63-150 (1947) ; CAL. PROD. CODE §§ 970-977 (Ann. 1944) ;
CONN. GErN STAT. §§ 2075-2081 (1949), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 227a (Supp. 1949),
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 449b (Supp. 1951); DEL. REV. CODE 1949 c. 405 (1935);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.041 (Supp. 1952); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 65A, § 5 (Supp.
1952); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 81, § 160 (1951); NEB. REV. STAT.
§9 77-2108 through 77-2112 (1943, reissue 1950); N. H. Rev. LAWS c. 88-A, § 1
(as added by L. 1943 c. 75 and L. 1947 c. 102); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:26-45-
3:26-53 (Supp. 1951); N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 124; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20
§ 881-887 (Supp. 1952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8350.7 (Williams, Supp. 1952);
TEx. RZEv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3883a. (1952) ; VA. CODE §§ 64-150-64-155 (1950).
3 INT. REV. CODE § 826 (c) (insurance proceeds) ; INT. Rev. CODE § 826 (d)
(property over which decedent had a power of appointment).
'" INT. Rev. CODE § 812 (e), Reg. 105 § 81.47, 81A8.
"Id. " 236 N. C. 654, 73 S. E. 2d 879 (1953).
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1943 Recomp. 1950) (time and manner of dissent);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 30-2 (1943, Recomp. 1950) "Upon such dissent the widow
shall have the same rights and estates in the real and personal property of her
husband as if he had died intestate."
[Vol. 31
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as to the allocation of the federal estate tax liability the court held that
the widow's one-half interest in the personalty of the estate 8 would be
computed after the payment of the federal estate tax. The decision re-
duced the share passing to the widow which lowered the marital de-
duction1" and resulted in a higher federal tax on the estate. However,
the decision in this particular case was not inequitable because had the
decision been otherwise the bequests to the principal beneficiaries would
have been wiped out. The court rejected the argument advanced con-
cerning the purpose of the marital deduction, 20 and held that pertinent
statutes 2' requiring distribution be made after the payment of debts.
The federal estate tax was held to come within the meaning of G. S.
§ 28-105 :22
"The debts of the decedent must be paid in the following
order:
"Fourth Class. Dues to the United States and to the State of
North Carolina.
'23
The court relied on Craig v. Craig24 where it was held that the estate
tax was chargeable to the residuary estate thus indicating the tax
"should be regarded as a charge against the whole estate, to be paid
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-149 (3) (1943, Recomp. 1950). The statute has re-
cently been amended, See note 27, infra. (Realty was not involved in the litiga-
tion).
10 INT. REv. CODE § 812 (e) (1) (E) (i). This section requires the marital de-
duction to be reduced by the amount of the tax payable on the interest of the
spouse. Thus, in the instant case had the tax been computed after the share was
allotted to the widow the reduction clause of the Code would not apply.
'0 "To place the property of married persons in common-law states on a more
nearly equal estate tax basis with the now reinstated "splitting" principle of
community property, the 1948 Act also amended the law to permit a married
person holding separate property to achieve substantially the same "splitting"
advantage, provided that he also accepted some of the community property dis-
advantages. This had been accomplished by the addition . . . of a "marital de-
duction" in computing the net estate subject to tax." MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL
TAXES 784 (1952).
" "The statute now in force in this state prescribes that the dissenting widow
shall recive one-half the personal state . . . and directs the personal representative,
in case of intestacy, after payment of debts in the order prescribed by G. S. 28-105;
to distribute the surplus in the manner set out in G. S. § 28-149. The word
surplus means the personal property left after payment of the debts of the de-
ceased and costs of administration." Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236
N . C. 654, 659, 73 S. E. 2d 879, 8S3 (1953).
22 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-105 (1943, Recomp. 1950).
23 "It will be noted that there are no citations in the General Statutes under
this subsection. Governmental claims against the individual have much increased
both in number and complexity since this law was written, and it is difficult to
know just what the rule means. It would certainly seem to include upaid in-
come taxes, both state and federal, if such taxes are not included in class three.
It would also seem to include any other form of tax, assessment or penalty im-
posed by state or federal law which the United States or the State of North
Carolina could collect by legal process of any nature." DOUGLAS, ADDIINIS nTTRIO
OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA § 218 at p. 166 (1948).
2'232 N. C. 729, 62 S. E. 2d 336 (1950).
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from the residuary estate in the same manner as debts and expenses of
administration." 2-5 Thus, North Carolina followed the majority rule
by refusing to apportion taxes without legislative guidance. Subse-
quent tax legislation which would have nullified the effect of the instant
case failed.
2 6
However, an amendment to the North Carolina distribution statute2 7
has been enacted which will allow the dissenting widow her statutory
share in personal property free of the federal estate tax in a situation
comparable to the facts of the Green case.
The distribution provision before the recent amendment provided 28
that if a man died intestate leaving a wife but no children the widow
would get all of the personal property up to $10,000 with the remainder
distributed one-half to the widow and one-half to the decedent's next of
kin who are in equal degree of kinship, or their legal representative.
In case the decedent died testate, and the widow dissented from the will,
she would take one-half the personal estate and the remainder would
be distributed according to the terms of the will.
Chapter 1325 (amendment to G. S. § 28-149 (3)) does not change
the basic distributions of personalty in form, but far different monetary
results may be obtained because of the addition of provisions relating
to the federal estate tax.
Chapter 1325 provides that in the situation where the widow is to
receive one-half the estate of the intestate which exceeds $10,000, the
one-half will be computed before any deduction for the federal tax. The
iemaining one-half which goes to the husband's next of kin is subject to
the federal tax. Apparently the $10,000 to be allotted the widow in this
situation (where the estate exceeds $10,000) is subject to the federal
tax for it is not expressly exempted. However, it would seem that be-
cause the share allotted to the next of kin is expressly made subject
to the federal tax that the $10,000 to the widow is exempt from the
tax in the same manner as her one-half share in the estate which exceeds
$10,000. If the husband dies testate and the widow dissents from the
will her one-half share in the personalty is exempt from the tax. The
remaining one-half which is 'distributed according to the decedent's will
bears the burden of the federal estate tax. Chapter 1325 further pro-
vides that nothing in the act will be construed to deprive a widow of
her right to a year's support.
" Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N. C. 654, 662, 72 S. E. 2d 879,
885 (1953). In Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill. App. 556, 101 N. E. 2d
604 (1951) the distribution statute provided that the dissenting spouse would be
entitled to a certain share "after the payment of all just claims." The federal
estate tax was held to be a "just claim" and the widow received her share after
deduction for the estate tax as in the principal case.
O S. B. 357, N. C. General Assembly 1953. Reported unfavorably April, 1953.
" H. B. 851, c. 1325 N. C. General Assembly 1953."N. C. Gen. Stat. § 28-149 (3) (1943, Recomp. 1950).
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Ohio, in Miller v. Hanmnond,29 reached a decision contra to the
principal case on similar facts. The dissenting widow was allowed her
statutory share free of the federal tax. The Ohio statutes involved are
comparable to those of North Carolina30 (but before c. 1325 was en-
acted in North Carolina). The Ohio court had to distinguish the
often-quoted decision of Y.M.C.A. v. Davis,3 ' where residuary charitable
institutions were burdened with the federal estate tax notwithstanding
the federal charitable deduction provisions. The court held that
Y.M.C.A. v. Davis was 'decided before the federal marital deduction
provision and it involved testamentary property whereas the Miller
case involved the dissenting share of a widow, i.e., intestate property.
This decision was followed by McDougall v. Central National Bank
32
where the court apportioned the tax between an intestate estate and an
inter vivos trust. However, in Vandervort v. Hodge,33 where the estate
consisted entirely of testate property, any trend toward a full apportion-
ment rule in Ohio was reversed and the residuary estate was charged
with the full burden of the federal estate tax. The court reiterated the
doctrine of Y.M.C.A. v. Davis and held it had been approved and dis-
distinguished in the Miller and McDougall cases.
Kentucky has long recognized the equitable rule of apportionment
where non-probate property was involved3 4 and recently allowed the dis-
senting spouse to take her share tax free35 on the premise that equitable
apportionment is within the inherent power of the courts. The court
reasoned that the marital deduction was enacted to equalize tax rights
between community and non-community property states, and as the
spouse's share would not add to the tax by virtue of the marital de-
duction she would not be liable for payment of any of the tax. Rhode
Island has apportioned the tax between testamentary and non-testa-
mentary property. In Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlog0 this court re-
quired contribution from six inter-vivos trusts where testator had di-
rected that taxes be paid from the residuary estate but neglected to
mention "any taxes which might be imposed by reason of the inter-vivos
"156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N. E. 2d 9 (1952).
OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 10509-121 (Supp. 1951).
"See note 7 mtpra.
32 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N. E. 2d 441 (1952). The theory of this case seemed
to be that there was a "common obligation" resting on the intestate estate and the
trust property to pay the estate tax, thus, it was apportioned between the two types
of property. Query as to whether there is any more of a common obligation in
this situation than there is in a case involving only probate assets, or the dissenting
share of a spouse.
" CCH INH. EsT. & GIFr TAx REP. 17,706 (1950), Ohio Ct. App. (1st.
App. D. 1953).
" Hamptons Admr. v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S. W. 496 (1920) ; Martin
v. Martin's Admr., 283 Ky. 513, 142 S. W. 2d 164 (1940) ; Trimble v. Hatcher's
Ex'rs., 295 Ky. 178, 173 S. W. 2d 985 (1943).
Lincoln Bank and Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S. W. 2d 89 (Ky. 1951).
"77 R. I. 428, 76 A. 2d 600 (1951).
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gifts in question. '3 - Georgia38 and Louisiana3 9 have applied the equi-
table rule and recently Indiana joined the ranks of the minority with a
strong denunciation of the common law rule. The latter court in Pearcy
v. The Citizens Bank and Trust Co.40 said:
We believe the cases from the states holding against the
right of apportionment except where there is specific statutory
authority therefore, or a specific provision therefor, in the will of
the decedent, are based upon an erroneous concept of the Federal
Estate Tax Act and a misinterpretation of provisions thereof.
The court applied the apportionment rule to survivorship property.
The apportionment rule has merit especially where intestate shares
or non-testamentary property, such as inter-vivos trusts, gifts, and
survivorship rights are involved because of the weakness of the residue
argument in situations such as these. It is well settled that the ultimate
burden of the tax is a matter of state law, thus, why is it necessary to
hold that because the federal estate tax is a charge on the whole estate,
the tax is in the position of debts of the estate and accordingly its pay-
ment falls on the residuary estate? It would seem that the non-testa-
mentary estate could be distinguished from the testamentary estate of
the decedent and be made to bear its own burden of the tax, if any.
"7 The testator's meaning was held to be a matter of conjecture. Two previ-
ous Rhode Island cases apportioning the federal estate tax were relied on by the
court. Trust Co. v. Watson, 76 R. I. 223, 68 A. 2d 916 (1949) (insurance pro-
ceeds) ; Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R. 1. 290, 33 A. 2d 206 (1942) (property passing
under power of appointment). Contribution in both cases were allowed pursuant
to the provisions of the Int. Rev. Code, note 13 supra. However, in the In-
dustrial Trust Co. case the court reasoned there was no distinction between prop-
erty passing under a power of appointment and property which a decedent had
placed in trust. Both types were out of a decedent's control, and neither type of
property constitutes part of a decedent's true estate. The Rhode Island court was
not deterred by the fact that the state did not have an apportionment statute.
The Rhode Island court did not invoke the doctrine of "implied direction," i.e.,
allowing contribution from the trust property because the testator did not mention
it in his direction, but held the distinguishing factor was between testamentary
and non-testamentary property. See Note, 31 B. U. L. REv. 233, 235 (1951).
"s Regents of University System of Georgia v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 194 Ga.
255, 21 S. E. 2d 691 (1942). The federal estate tax was apportioned between
the individual estate of testatrix and property passing under power of appoint-
ment notwithstanding a statute which provided the tax would be a charge against
the estate and not against the individual shares. The court held the property
passing under the appointment was separate and distinct from the donee's own estate
thus both classes of property should bear the burden of the tax. Section 826 (d)
of the Code was not in effect at the decedent's death, thus, the court had to rely
solely on its equitable powers to apportion the tax.
" Succession of Ratcliff, 212 La. 563, 33 So. 2d 114 (1947) (survivor-
ship property). ". . . equitable principles demand that the burden be divided
between all persons sharing in the estate in accordance with their respective in-
terests." Id.. 33 So. 2d at 117.
4 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N. E. 2d 918 (1951). In this case the court relied on
equitable apportionment for survivorship property but required contribution from




This reasoning is even stronger in a situation where decedent has di-
rected the burden of the tax on the residuary without mentioning inter-
vivos transfers or survivorship property.
Those jurisdictions having apportionment statutes 41 reach all of the
assets by typically providing that the tax will be apportioned among
those interested in the estate4 2 but those interests will be allowed any
deductions granted under the act imposing the tax.43 The latter phrase
allows the parties who qualify to take the deductions offered in the
Internal Revenue Code.44  However, apportionment states are faced
with a conflict between their proration laws and their distribution
statutes as to the method of computation of the share. The widow's
share has been computed tax free4 5 notwithstanding a distribution
statute declaring her interest to share ratably in the tax, because the
apportionment act indicated a legislative policy not to tax any interest
that did not add to the tax burden. The same result has been reached
on the theory that the distribution statute did not provide a method of
computation of the widow's share but only set an upper limit to which
the taker was entitled.
46
Connecticut allowed the widow's share to pass tax free despite a di-
rection by testator to the executor "to pay ... all my just and lawful
debts, funeral and testamentary expenses. '47  The words did not cover
the payment of federal estate taxes, said the court, and if the marital
deduction was not allowed it would substantially increase the tax. In
Estate of Dontald Bayne,4s testator gave one-half of the residuary estate
in trust to his wife for life, and created two trusts of one-fourth each
from the other half. Testator directed "all ... taxes which may accrue
hereunder ... be paid out of my general estate." It was held that the
' See note 12 mtpra.
'2 CAL. PROB. CODE § 970 (Ann. 1944) ("shall be equitably prorated among
persons interested in the estate to whom such property is or may be transferred or
to whom any benefit accrues.")
" CAL. PROB. CODE (Ann. 1944) ("In making a proration allowances shall
be made for any exemptions granted by the act imposing the tax and for any de-
ductions allowed by such act for the purpose of arriving at the value of the net
estate.")
"INT. RE v. CODE § 812.
"In re Fuch's Estate, 60 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
It re Peter's Will, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 651 (1949), affd. 89 N. Y. S. 2d 651
(1949) ; Estate of Frank Wolf, CCH INH. EsT. & Grvr TAx REP. 17,705 (1950),
N. Y. Surr. Ct, N. Y. Co. (1953). The "upper limit" doctrine originated in In
re Goldsmith's Estate, 177 Misc. 298, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 474 (1941) where the court
distinguished between the words "intestate share" and "share in intestacy." The
New York distribution statute limited the "intestate share" to no more than one-
half the net estate of decedent. The court held that this was a "term of art"
setting an upper limit to the "share in intestacy" but not providing a method of
computation of the "share in intestacy."
"'Jerome v. Jerome, CCH INH. EsT. & GiFT TAX REP. 1 17,666 (1950),
Conn. Sun. Ct. Err. (1952).
" CCH INH. EsT. & GiFT TAX REP. 17,321 (1950), N. Y. Surr. Ct., Westch.
Co. (1950).
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words "general estate" were equivalent to "residuary estate" and
amounted to an implied direction against apportionment but there was
no direction for or against apportionment of such taxes imposed on the
residuary gifts within the respective shares comprising the residuary
estate.
The foregoing material has pointed up some of the highly technical
difficulties encountered in arriving at an individual's estate tax burden.
The trend is towards equitable apportionment and some states have
bills in the current legislative sessions to provide for statutory appor-
tionment.49  In the principal case, North Carolina seems to have de-
cided to stay inexorably with the common law view of pressing the
entire estate tax burden on the residuary estate. The court distinguished
a Kentucky case as applying an equitable apportionment rule5" which
indicates it will not adopt any. The recent amendment to the North
Carolina distribution statute, c. 1325, will allow the widow a full marital
deduction where there are no children, but it is submitted that a com-
plete apportionment statute would be more equitable and it would give
monetary relief to those unlucky enough to "reside in the residue."
JACK D. YARBROUGH.
Landlord and Tenant-Leases-Rights of Lessees under Oral Leases
In decisions growing out of a recent litigation, involving three ap-
peals,1 the Supreme Court has clarified considerably the North Carolina
position on some of the rights of oral lessees, but at the same time has
cast some doubt as to other rights under such oral leases.
2
The litigation involved a situation wherein the plaintiff had, by oral
agreement, leased two tobacco warehouses for three tobacco marketing
'o Arizona-H. 45. Amends estate tax code to conform to federal provisions
governing marital deduction. (Approved, March 13, 1953).
Connecticut-S. 203. Provides a more equitable apportionment of the federal
estate tax within a fund consisting of the proceeds of life insurance. (Conn. has
an apportionment statute, see note 12, supra).
Iowa-S. 345. Provides for equitable apportionment of estate tax among
those interested in the estate.
Nebraska-LB. 578. Provides that the interest of any surviving spouse shall
be determined prior to the payment of any federal estate tax or state inheritance
tax. (Neb. has an apportionment statute. See note 12, supra).
Tennessee-S. 597. Permits marital deduction on inheritance tax. (Tenn. has
an apportionment statute. See note 12, supra).
Vermont-H. 509. Relates to apportionment of federal estate tax in certain
cases.
West Virginia-H. 24. Relates to the apportionment of death taxes among
persons interested in the estate of decedent. CCH INH. EsT. & Ginr TAx REp.
(1950), 1953 Pending Legislation, 186,501, 509.
"' Note 35 supra.
IPerkins v. Langdon, 231 N. C. 386, 57 S. E. 2d 407 (1950); Perkins v.
Langdon, 233 N. C. 240, 63 S. E. 2d 565 (1951) ; Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C.
159. 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953).
1 It will be the object of this note to point up both results.
[Vol. 31
